Another layer to the Rare Earths Cake?
April 2025 transformed all global trade - and specifically in our field - rare earths. Trump’s “Liberation Day” ended the formerly US-led “liberal” trade system, as friends, rivals, and even an archipelago (the Heard and McDonald Islands) inhabited solely by penguins felt the wrath of his tariffs.
Many countries rushed to dealmaking with Trump. China chose a more muscular response: designating most heavy rare earths—and materials containing more than 0.1% of them, such as high-temperature NdFeB magnets—as dual-use items, subject to export licences.
Uncontrolled Rare Earths | ||||||
La | Ce | Pr[1] | Nd | Pm | ||
Export Controlled Rare earths (suspended until November 2026) | ||||||
Er | Eu | Yb | Tm | Ho | ||
Export Controlled Rare Earths (as of April 2025) | ||||||
Sm | Tb | Y | Lu | Gd | Sc | Dy |
Although the magnet rare earths[2] (Nd, Pr, Dy, and Tb) receive the most attention, this dispatch examines two export controlled heavy rare earths (“HRE”) we spend more time with at Lipmann Walton: yttrium and gadolinium.
First, however, it’s worth examining the deeper roots of China’s rare earth (“RE”) trade restrictions.
Why Rare Earths and Why Now?
Throughout the 21st century, Beijing has worked hard to centralize control over the Chinese industry, motivated by a desire to capture more of the value chain, as well as concerns over pollution, illegal mining, and resource depletion.
The centralization drive that began in the early 2000s saw China consolidate private firms into state-owned enterprises, impose production and export quotas, and tax exports of RE ores, compounds, and metals (the highest taxes were for Dy and Tb exports). Before public attention surged in 2010, China had already sharply reduced RE oxide-equivalent exports.
In effect, Chinese authorities signalled plans to reduce exports of RE materials over 20 years ago. While the official motives were environmental and resource preservation-related, China’s response in to the 2010 Senkaku-Diaoyu dispute—where exports of some RE to Japan were throttled during the flareup of a territorial dispute—illustrated how this industrial control could be punitively deployed.
The WTO ruled against China’s RE export regime in 2014, noting that China’s environmental concerns over RE production were legitimate, but its export-focused quotas and taxes only harmed foreign consumers while benefitting Chinese firms and failing to address pollution. China complied, abandoning its RE export quotas and taxes that year.
In retrospect, the WTO “win” was an own goal. A relatively orderly period of increasing prices that could’ve led to a reopening of ex-China capacity (i.e., companies producing usable rare earth compounds outside of China) was deferred. Instead, China was left with a powerful arrow in its quiver and the ex-China RE renaissance foundered.
This history demonstrates that China’s current export-licence regime can be conceived of as a new tool for an old goal: reducing lower-value RE exports, at a convenient moment when the US is easily portrayed as the trade-hating aggressor.
China’s reasons for restricting RE exports thus run deeper than the current trade war. Its overriding critical-materials goal is to supply domestic industry abundantly and cheaply. Exporting those materials at similarly low prices depletes resources while paying environmental costs at home and capturing less of the RE value chain. The dual-use regime is therefore a powerful lever to raise export profitability, reduce export volumes, and retaliate against US mercantilism without fear of WTO reprisal.[3]
Although geopolitics shaped the timing and severity of the current licence regime, we expect RE trade to remain restricted, even if the US and China reach a detente.
Yttrium
What do dental crowns, jet engines, and fake diamonds have in common? Yttrium—a formerly unsung RE hero.
Although pundits long warned about China’s ability to control dysprosium, terbium, and permanent magnets, export-controlled yttrium has seen the largest percentage price increase since April 2025: from under US$10/kg of 99.999% Y2O3 to around US$1,000/kg or more.

In hindsight, yttrium’s criticality for ex-China manufacturing is clear. China exported thousands of tonnes annually and key Western industries—aerospace, defence, medical equipment, semiconductors, and electronics—depend on it. Aeroengines and industrial gas turbines use yttrium in thermal barrier coatings, and yttrium ceramics are essential in chip manufacturing plasma etch chambers, microelectronic multilayer ceramic capacitors, dental implants, and medical lasers.
The US has been hit particularly hard by export controls. According to Chinese customs data, in 2024 the USA imported 329 Tonnes of Yttrium oxide and 12 Tonnes of yttrium metal directly from China. Since April 2025, exports from China to the US have been a mere 97 Tonnes of oxide and no yttrium metal. This has hampered industrial gas turbine and aerospace production; two genuinely competitive US manufacturing industries. Nonetheless, yttrium continues to receive less attention from the US government and rare earth companies than its glamorous cousins Dysprosium and Terbium.
While non-China demand for yttrium is significant, supply options are scarce. Most non-China RE aspirants still overlook yttrium despite its mature market and criticality for key industries. Lynas plans to produce yttrium oxide in 2028. Until then, only recyclers have stepped up.
Yttrium users have plugged the gap of missing Chinese exports so-far through a variety of means: finding old stock available outside of China without a license; purchasing from stockpilers and investors; and thrifting available material. Some price-sensitive companies have stopped production of certain yttrium-bearing intermediaries and products, or resorted to buying finished products and compounds from China which are further down the value-chain and not subject to dual-use export licenses.
While there’s no telling today what the ‘fair market price’ for non-Chinese yttrium will be in the future, many western end-users have swallowed the increased cost to avoid shuttering production lines. It’s unlikely to remain a US$ 1000/kg+ market, but it’s clear that yttrium deserves more attention and urgency from non-Chinese RR producers and hopefuls.
Gadolinium
Gadolinium is among the more esoteric REs. With no specific HS code, precise export data are unavailable, making ex-China market size difficult to gauge. This lack of data has reinforced neglect, and gadolinium has received even less attention than yttrium since controls began. Yet gadolinium oxide spot prices have risen similarly, from around US$30/kg for 99.99% min. material to over US$1,300/kg.
As this price movement indicates, Gadolinium serves rather crucial applications. It is the go-to MRI contrast agent and has several niche applications in the nuclear sector and electronics.
![MRI of a stroke-patient's brain before (left) and after (right) receiving Gd contrast agent. [4] The location of the stroke is visible on the right side after the contrast agent has accumulated in that part of the patient's brain.](https://static.wixstatic.com/media/ef0f58_73cd7ef9345340fb818ecb6579319e03~mv2.jpg/v1/fill/w_980,h_608,al_c,q_85,usm_0.66_1.00_0.01,enc_avif,quality_auto/ef0f58_73cd7ef9345340fb818ecb6579319e03~mv2.jpg)
The most interesting development in the Gadolinium market has been the emergence of a multi-tier customer base since April 2025. Some industries, like medical users appear to receive licences (and nuclear demand is opaque), while electronics, defence, and other industries face the volatile, high-priced spot market. And, as Chinese producers have seen Western spot prices, they have sought to raise export prices even for licenced users, creating a three-tiered market.[5]
Although some market commentators and consultants like to point out that the spot market price assessments published by journals like Argus and Fastmarkets represent a small portion of the total market, it’s worth remembering that those prices are what many of ex-China end-users encounter when looking to purchase for prompt delivery without indefinite lead-times for license review, the fear of a licence rejection, or sharing the sensitive information required for a licence approval.

Lynas and Energy fuels are targeting production of separated gadolinium oxide for late 2027 and 2028, respectively. Nonetheless, Gadolinium oxide from non-China sources will remain constrained for at least another year—and likely longer. Despite the US government’s decision to provide a price guarantee for MP Materials’ NdPr oxide, perhaps gadolinium and yttrium deserve more activist governmental intervention?
More Restrictions?
With a market increasingly governed by volatile geopolitics, long-term predictions are difficult. However, there are some likely developments in the short- to medium-term.
Firstly, China has suspended additional export controls, first announced in October 2025, until November 2026. With diplomacy so-far failing to thaw icy Sino-American relations, and the Trump administration introducing further tariffs and flailing militarily in the Middle East, it is unlikely in the current geopolitical climate that China will feel the need to “play nice” come November.
Instead, China is tightening dual-use controls. Ever more American, Japanese, and EU entities are coming under scrutiny finding themselves on “unreliable entity” lists. Chinese RE expertise, equipment, and personnel are increasingly closely guarded, causing further headaches for ex-China producers. Case in point, expected costs for Lynas’ Malaysia HRE facility have increased by $80 million to $205 million, partly due to costs of sourcing non-Chinese equipment. That example is merely a taste of what could come, if China’s full suite of “suspended” export controls are reintroduced in November 2026.
The silver lining for ex-China consumers is that the three-tiered RE market heralds opportunities for ex-China producers. While companies receiving licences are likely to remain buyers of Chinese-origin material, the high prices in the unlicenced spot market show that demand for ex-China HRE is strong enough—and the applications critical enough—to justify expanding into these important markets.
As for the tariffed penguins—one must hope they are sitting solely on eggs, and not RE-bearing eudialyte “deposits” like their Greenlandic cousins…
[1] Radioactive Promethium is not found naturally on earth except as a short-lived product of uranium decay and has no real market.
[2] I define the magnet rare earths as the key ingredients in NdFeB magnet alloys. While others such as Sm, and even Gd and Ce are also used in certain magnets, NdFeB magnets with Nd and Pr, and doped with Dy and/or Tb, are the most economically and politically significant rare earth magnets.
[3] The WTO is now essentially a moot court. Cases sent to appeal are left in limbo, due to a lack of quorum on the appellate body and the US blocking appointments.
[4] Hellerhoff (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Bluthirnschranke_nach_Infarkt_nativ_und_KM.png), „Bluthirnschranke nach Infarkt nativ und KM“, https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/legalcode
[5] A similar dynamic has emerged to a certain extent in the yttrium market.




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